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1.1 In planning for the future, we face two basic challenges. First, 
we must organize our steps to deal with the uneven temporal 
distribution of t h e  opportunities and resources to make 
progress in our pursuits. Second, we need to deal with our limited 
knowledge of the future and with the changes that this 
knowledge undergoes over time. We hardly ever plan while being 
certain of all the relevant future circumstances. 
 
Our intentions have a built-in protection against the 
unexpected: it is in principle always possible to give up an 
intention in the face of unanticipated future circumstances. Yet 
this should be a strategy of last resort, to be used sparingly and 
judiciously. Over-reliance on changes of mind, even when 
justified, would undermine the stability of intentions, which is a 
distinctive feature of the standard operation of intentions and a 
major source of the appeal of  planning abilities. 
1.2 Our plans need to balance stability and flexibility. We must 
avoid two opposite responses to uncertainty and risk, just giving 
up the intention altogether as we come to learn more, or a 
reluctance to undertake any plan at all when we are not certain 
about the future. 
 
There are two obvious strategies to make intentions more 
flexible, while preserving their stability. First, as Bratman (1987) 
shows, our plans are partial: they need not specify all the details 
of implementation. We make appropriate adjustments as we 
progress and acquire relevant knowledge. 
 
Second, most intentions are conditional. Even when expressed 
categorically, as intentions to φ, we are not usually committed to φ-
ing no matter what. Most ordinary intentions are implicitly 
conditional upon circumstances we are uncertain about—they are 
of the form “I intend to φ if C,” where C has not yet been 
	ascertained by us.1 
1.3 Here I present an additional strategy: the contemporaneous 
pursuit for the time being of two or more eventually 
incompatible projects. Consider a not yet fully resolved traveling 
plan: I am settled on either going to a conference in Italy or to a 
festival in Austria. The two projects are incompatible because 
the events are contemporaneous. Although I have not yet made 
up my mind between the two, I have already determined that I 
am going to one of them. Hence I can legitimately say: “I intend 
to go either to Italy or to Austria.” 
 
Let’s call these intentions pro-tempore disjunctive (PTD, for 
short). They are usually undertaken when we don’t yet know 
which alternative is preferable while expecting that we will gain 
relevant information later, at which point we will continue to 
pursue only one of the alternatives. 
 
1.4 PTD intentions are a familiar strategy to trade off stability 
and flexibility. But one that has been neglected by philosophers, 
with the exception of Holton (2009). They are worth of a closer 
look. There is much that we can learn from them about the 
nature and dynamics of planning agency. 
 
I first discuss simple disjunctive intentions, where one is 
indifferent between the alternatives. I then show that PTD intentions 
a r e  different from simple disjunctive intentions. I discuss how PTD 
intentions meet the rational pressures of intentions and how they 
settle practical matters. PTD intentions are a pervasive feature of 
diachronic agency: they are the simplest tools to agglomerate 
potentially conflicting pursuits without rejecting them outright. 
They are the basic strategy for balancing both rigidity and 
flexibility, and stability and responsiveness to changing 
circumstances. I close by rejecting Holton’s partial intentions. 
We should not introduce a novel kind of attitude: all-out intentions 




2 Disjunction of Indifference 
 
	2.1 When one is indifferent between two incompatible courses 
of action, one can acquire a disjunctive intention of 
indifference. Someone approaches me with a tray with two 
cookies. I only want one and I am indifferent between them. I 
just need to form the intention to either get cookie A or get 
cookie B, that is, to make true the disjunction (get A  get B). 
Because of my indifference, I need not be more specific. No need 
to settle for ‘getting the closest cookie,’ say. After all, by the 
time I reach the tray, the cookies might be equidistant from me. It 
only matters that I get one. 
 
2.2 Disjunctive plans of indifference are common. But their 
incompleteness might be troubling. An intention is supposed to 
settle what to do, but a disjunctive plan leaves open  what the 
agent is to do once she reaches the “conflict point” (c-point, 
hereafter) where the two alternatives become incompatible. Even 
so, a disjunctive intention has practical import. Prior to the c-
point, it guides one’s conduct to reach the c-point (i.e., to get 
within the reach of the cookies). And it continues to guide even at 
the c-point by telling what not to do then: not to refrain from 
reaching for one of the cookies. It directs the  agent  away from 
the complement of the disjunction, which is the practical import 
that Buridan’s ass missed. 
 
The disjunctive intention does not tell one which cookie to 
pick. But this is unproblematic. The intention fulfills its 
guiding role as long as it secure the presence, at c-point, of 
some mechanism that moves one to pick one cookie. The 
resolution of this practical underdetermination does not need to 
come from an intention with a non-disjunctive content (i.e., 
directed at a specific cookie). The intention is only for making a 
disjunction true, which is something that at c-point can be 
accomplished by whatever psychological or physiological 
mechanism might make one grab a cookie. 
2.3 To sum up, given one’s indifference, the job of an intention as a 
planning attitude, is fully discharged by a purely disjunctive intention to 
(A  B). This intention is fully adequate to discharge its 
characteristic job: settling on and stably guiding future conduct, 
framing further deliberation, and coordinating conduct 
transtemporally and interpersonally. 
	 
This intention needs to be paired with the power to pick 
one disjunct. But this is just one of the fundamental executive 
capacities that all agents need in order to carry out any of their 
intentions. 
2.4 Purely disjunctive intentions are familiar but they apply to a 
limited range of circumstances. An intention to (A  B) is 
adequate when one is indifferent between A and B but the two 
options do not call for distinctive preparations and the choice 
between them does not have distinct long-term effects. In the 
cookie example, no specific preparation is required. Upstream of 
the c-point, one is only required to keep the possibility of future 
choice open. And once the choice is made, one does not expect 
it to have divergent downstream effects. 
 
2.5 This analysis applies also to cases of normative 
underdetermination (including those due to incommensurability 
and parity). When facing the prospect of two incompatible 
options that one cannot rank, as far as planning is concerned, one 
might simply settle for making their disjunction true. This is not 
to deny that, given the specific source of the underdetermination, 
the agent might have other resources that could help choose or 
pick between the options when she reaches the c-point. But the 
resources that come from intentions as planning attitudes run 
out in the face of this underdetermination, if one anticipates that 
the underdetermination is going to persist up to the c-point. 
This is so even if one takes into account the needs for advanced 
coordination with one’s future choice between the two options. 
 
Obviously, the choice at the c-point is much more 
momentous in cases of underdetermination than in those of mere 
indifference, including the potential for massively divergent 
downstream effects. But in a genuinely persistent 
underdetermination, even the anticipation of divergent 
downstream effects cannot make a difference to what the planning 
capacities might contribute. The best we can do is to settle for 
making a disjunction true.2 
2.6 A disjunctive intention puts no pressure on keeping the 
options open. If the opportunity to carry it out by going for one 
of the disjuncts arises earlier than the anticipated c-point, one 
	might be strongly advised to take it (but not required to do so, 
if the opportunity for future success remains available). 
Likewise, if one expects future success in executing one of the 
disjuncts, it is permissible to let go of taking means necessary 
for the pursuit of the other. Nonetheless, if the disjuncts do not 
make distinct and costly preparatory demands, one might keep 
both open until the c-point. Incommensurability over 
momentous choices might favor delaying the choice but this 
delay is rationally demanded only if one suspects that 




3 Pro-Tempore Disjunctive Intentions 
 
3.1 Let’s return to the original scenario about my summer 
vacation and consider how it differs from a plan to make a 
disjunction true. First, I am not indifferent between Italy and 
Austria. It is rather that I am presently unable to tell which 
among these two incompatible options is better. I expect to be 
in a position to rank them later on account of either new 
information or the additional time I can devote to deliberation. I 
might even expect one of the two options to turn especially 
bad, possibly one to be avoided at all costs (if, for instance, I 
were to learn that my archenemy is expected to be at one of those 
locations). Nonetheless, I have already determined that I should 
restrict my travel options to these two locations and I am 
already under a pressure to start making the appropriate 
arrangements. 
 
In this scenario, I am not intending to make the disjunction 
(going to Italy  going to Austria) true, as if I were indifferent 
between the options. In particular, I am committed to keeping 
them open for the time being, since I do not yet know which 
one will turn out to be preferable at a later time. This makes a 
real difference if, as it is often the case, the preparatory 
arrangements for the two options are substantially different. 
When so, to keep both of them open carries a price. In addition 
to the distinct preparatory steps, I have to pay various costs, 
including those associated with the delaying of the final 
determination and with the forgoing of opportunities for 
	alternative investments. But the circumstances might be such 
that it would still be reasonable for me to incur these costs, 
rather than risking to make either option impossible or being 
forced to make an early choice under more limited information. 
 
The plan is not to leave the matter unresolved, in an 
unattended manner. This strategy might be best in those cases 
where delaying the preparation carries limited costs, if any. But 
this is not so in the present scenario. Hence, the plan is not to let 
the events run their course, make no commitment, and revisit 
the question later at a hopefully more favorable time. Here I am 
rather undertaking the intention to sustain the viability of the 
options until I am in a better position to make a choice, either 
because I will have gained more relevant information or I will 
face an unavoidable c-point. 
3.2 What I have is an intention. It is the intention to sustain the 
viability of two options (Italy and Austria) for the time being in 
spite of their eventual incompatibility. This is not a case of simply 
intending to make a disjunction true. It is rather a plan that comes 
in two stages: at the earlier stage, while the implementation of 
both options is still possible and I am still waiting to determine 
which is best, I am pursuing both. At the later stage, once I have 
determined which is best or I am faced with an inevitable c-
point, I only pursue one (although, prior to that moment, I do 
not yet know which one). This is a familiar kind of plan, whose 
form underlies many of our disjunctive expressions of intention. 
Oftentimes, when we say that we intend to do either A or B, we 
are not expressing indifference but rather a pro tempore 
disjunctive intention. 
 
Here is a more formal characterization of the content of a pro-
tempore disjunctive intention (PTD intention). Given two 
eventually co-impossible goals A and B, let’s call c-point the 
time when the two goals inevitably conflict and it is no longer 
possible to continue to pursue both; let’s call d-point the moment 
prior to (and inclusive of) the c-point when the subject 
determines, if ever, which     option is better than the other. 
 
A pro-tempore disjunctive intention to pursue either A 
or B is the intention: 
	 
1. to pursue A at least until d-point (or until c-point if 
there is no d-point), and 
2. to purse B at least until d-point (or until c-point if there 
is no d-point), and 
3. to continue pursing A past d-point only if A is deemed 
better than B at that time, and 
4. to continue pursuing B past d-point only if B is 
deemed better than A at that time, and 
5. to purse (A  B) as a matter of indifference at c-point 
if there has been no prior or contemporaneous d-point,3 
6. while believing throughout that A and B are co-
impossible past the c-point. 
 
3.3 Because of the two stages, a PTD intention does not run afoul 
of the demand for agglomerativity. As Bratman (1987, 134) has 
compellingly argued, “given the role of intentions in coordination, 
there is a rational pressure for an agent to put his various 
intentions together into a larger intention.” The “larger intention” 
has usually been interpreted as the conjunction of the objects of the 
agent’s intentions. For instance, if I intend to go to Italy and I 
intend to go to Austria, I am under a rational pressure to intend 
to go both to Italy and to Austria.4 
 
The principle of agglomerativity formalizes the intuitive idea 
that a rational agent is not to embark on a self-defeating course of 
action. The rational agent must avoid the contemporaneous 
pursuit of co-impossible goals. But this does not entail that the 
agent is to give up one of the goals altogether, at least not from 
the very beginning. Given that the pursuits are co-impossible 
only past the c-point, it is not irrational to continue pursuing 
both, up until that point, in the form of a PTD plan. That is, with 
the knowledge that one is going to face a choice between them 
no later than at c-point. 
3.4 The mutual consistency among one’s plans is something to 
be achieved dynamically, as one progresses in their pursuit and one 
acquires (and sometimes loses) additional relevant information. 
 
The simplest method to secure consistency is to give up one 
	of the co-impossible goals. But this might be too radical and 
premature a response, especially if one expects to gain relevant 
information later. 
 
Another useful strategy is to subordinate one pursuit to the 
other. I might settle on Italy and intend to go to Austria only if 
going to Italy becomes impossible or unadvisable. When so, I am 
no longer under a demand to take steps to go to Austria, as long 
as the Italy option is still feasible. Hence, I take on the risk of 
incurring additional costs if going to Italy turns out later to be 
unfeasible or unadvisable (given that, by that time, the trip to 
Austria might have become much more expensive, if not 
impossible). 
3.5 Alternatively, I could pursue both plans in a conditional form. 
I might list the conditions CI under which I intend to go to Italy, 
and the conditions CA under which I intend to go to Austria. If 
CI and CA are mutually exclusive, I might be able to 
agglomerate the two intentions without irrationality, provided 
that the preparatory steps do not encroach on each other (by 
making one pursuit possible at the expenses of the other). I 
still cannot expect to succeed at both, but the failure would not 
count as self-defeating conduct. Rather, because of the mutually 
exclusive conditions, at least one of the plans will turn moot 
once its conditions are no longer believed to be possible.5 
 
The conditional strategy is a more sophisticated form of 
the dynamical consistency secured by PTD: it requires the 
articulation of conditions that qualify the alternative options. By 
comparison, a PTD intention only requires that one is committed 
to keeping the options open while one is trying to figure out which 
one is preferable. As one learns more about the alternatives, 
however, the PTD intention might transform into a combination 
of two conditional plans, with mutually exclusive antecedents. 
This kind of metamorphosis is part and parcel of the adjustments 
that a rational agent makes in securing the mutual consistency 
and continuous progress of her plans over time. 
3.6 All these strategies for mutual consistency are in principle 
equally available. Which strategy is preferable depends on the 
specific circumstances. But the PTD strategy is always the 
simplest strategy to dynamically handle competing demands of 
	eventually incompatible projects—short of renouncing one’s goals 
altogether. 
 
As the simplest strategy, it does not impose a specific 
structure on how the plan is to unfold. It does not articulate in 
advance the specific conditions under which one option rather 
than the other is to be pursued. Nor does it institute a structure of 
subordination. But it is a useful starting point, which occasionally 
might lead to subordination or articulation of more specific 
conditions. Because of its simplicity, it might be abused and 
become a tool for massive procrastination. An agent who is 
reluctant to make choices might continue to undertake more and 
more eventually incompatible projects in the PTD from, but later 
face the dreaded moments of choice at much higher costs. On 
the positive side, learning about PTD structure and its 
characteristic demands helps us become more proficient in 
handling the balance between fixity and stability, on the one hand, 
and flexibility and responsiveness to changing circumstances, on 
the other. It offers the basic tool to keep concurrent projects open 
but also to develop strategies to reduce the risks and costs 
associated with concurrent pursuits (for instance, by inviting us 
to settle on projects with a larger overlap in preparatory steps or 
to increase reliance on of all-purpose means). 
 
PTD plans are the most basic tools for managing the 
temporal agglomeration of distinct projects and for achieving 
dynamic consistency by limited agents like us, who need to 
handle the uneven temporal distribution of resources and 
opportunities for action, and their limited information. It allows 
for the simplest, even if only temporary, integration. This 
integration is a better strategy than the rigidity of agents who 
either refuse to undertake incompatible plans altogether or 
undertake them while ignoring their eventual incompatibility, 
thereby setting themselves up for the high costs of the 
unanticipated later encounters with c-points. 
 
3.7 There is still a concern with PTD plans. The characteristic 
benefits of planning derive from its power to settle o n e ’ s  
c o n d u c t  in advance, but a PTD intention might still leave wide 
open what the agent is going to do. Can one really settle a practical 
question in a stable manner by acquiring a PTD intention? 
	 
Consider stability. A PTD intention is subject to the pressure 
for stability with the same force and character as any other 
intention. That a rational agent is expected to drop one of the 
disjuncts does not make her intention more unstable. Dropping 
one of the options is not the same as giving up the PTD intention 
altogether. Rather, it is   a rational transformation that the intention 
is supposed to undergo as time goes by and more information is 
acquired. This is similar to the metamorphosis that occurs to a 
conditional intention, when the conditions are taken to hold and 
the antecedent is   thereby discharged. When so, one is not giving 
up the original conditional intention, one rather continues to carry 
it out in its new categorical shape.6 Likewise, once the agent drops 
one disjunct, she continues to carry out the same intention in its 
new non-disjunctive form. 
 
This conclusion holds for all rational pressures constitutive 
of intending (such as means-end coherence and 
agglomerativity), not just stability. They  apply with the same 
force regardless of the content of the intention. In this sense, a 
conditional intention is not weaker than a categorical one. 
Likewise for PTD intentions, which are neither weaker nor more 
unstable than categorical ones. This is why an agent can be settled 
on a PTD intention as much as she is on a categorical one. 
3.8 At least, this is so for what might be called “structural” 
settledness. A rational agent is structurally settled on what she 
is going to do in the future by way of taking a distinctive 
attitude—an intention—toward her future conduct. There is still 
a substantive question: what is she settled on? This depends on 
the content of the intention rather than the nature of her 
attitude. In the substantive sense, a PTD intention seems to 
determine much less about one’s future conduct than a 
categorical intention, for much is still open about what one is 
going to do both before and after the c-point. This might 
seriously reduce the contribution of PTD intentions to 
transtemporal intra- and inter- personal coordination—which is a 
distinctive benefit of our reliance on intentions. 
 
But PTD intentions still help with coordination. Like any 
intention, a PTD one restricts the range of conduct expected of a 
rational agent. At the very minimum, a rational agent is not to 
	make impossible for her to carry out her intention. For a PTD 
intention, prior to c-point, the range of expected conduct might 
actually be more limited than for a categorical one to pursue just 
one disjunct. For instance, before reaching the c-point, not all 
the ways of my going to Italy are compatible with my going to 
Austria. Hence, if you need to coordinate with my position prior 
to the c-point, there are situations in which you might be better 
off if I have a PTD intention rather than an unconditional one. 
Prior to the c-point, there are fewer courses of action that I might 
rationally take in the PTD case than in the unconditional one. For 
prior to the c-point, I am not expected to make progress toward 
my going to Italy in a way incompatible with my going to 
Austria. When you consider coordination after the c-point, 
however, my PTD intention is less useful than an unconditional 
one, because of the divergent unfolding of the ways in which I 
might rationally pursue the plan that I have now chosen at the 
expenses of the other. In any event, even after the c-point, 
having a PTD intention still provides a better guide for 
transtemporal coordination than having no intention at all. 
3.9 Coordination only requires that one be able to determine, at 
least roughly, the size and shape of the area where the rational 
agent is supposed to be on account of her intention. A rational 
agent is not supposed to get outside of this area, since this exit 
would amount to a failure of her project. This is not the same as 
coordinating with an agent who is settled on a very specific goal 
which can only be implemented in a univocal way. When so, one 
could anticipate each and every move of this agent and reduce the 
area for coordination to a single trajectory. But this is a limiting 
case. Much coordination, especially for the longer term, is done 
by securing that one stays within a certain area rather than on a 
specific trajectory. 
 
The smaller the area, the easier it is to anticipate where the 
agent will be and to coordinate with her based on her expected 
future location. The extent of this area, however, is not simply a 
matter of the form taken by the content of the intention. A PTD 
intention might actually delimit a smaller area than a categorical 
one. After all, my PTD intention “to go either to Italy or to 
Austria” is more helpful, for purposes of coordination, than a 
non-disjunctive but more generic intention “to go to Europe.” 
 
	 
4 The Pervasiveness of Pro-Tempore Disjunctive Intentions 
 
4.1 The structure of PTD intentions is not just a curiosity. It is a 
pervasive feature of our intentional diachronic agency. It 
provides the basic strategy to secure the dynamic consistency of 
our plans in their temporal unfolding, given that we need to 
respond to our previous successes and failures, and to changes in 
relevant information. PTD intentions are not limited to brand 
new plans about options we are yet unable to rank. They might 
also be adopted to agglomerate a new goal with some old ones. 
PTD intentions work as placeholders for future choices, while 
we continue to move on with all of our concurrent (although 
not all eventually co-possible) projects. 
4.2 In addition, the PTD structure underlies the “partiality” of 
plans (see Bratman 1987). Many details about implementation 
are initially left unspecified and they are filled over time. As one 
gets closer to the need to take more specific steps, additional and 
more accurate information is usually more easily available to 
help determine the details of implementation. 
 
Partiality is just a special instance of the PTD structure. Let’s 
imagine that one intends to φ at a later time t3. Consider the step 
that she has to take at t2 to progress toward her later φ-ing. This 
step might take very different specific shapes, s1, s2, . . . , sm. These 
shapes are mutually incompatible pieces of local conduct. 
When the agent at t1 thinks about what she is going to do at t2, 
she might be in no better position than to  intend to  take one 
of  these s teps ,  without  knowing yet which one. But she is 
also committed to keeping them open for the time being. For she 
is committed to taking whatever steps will help her progress 
toward her future φ-ing. In other words, at t1 she intends pro-
tempore to either s1 or s2 or . . . or sm at t2 (which are ultimately co-
impossible implementations). As she gathers additional relevant 
information, she might decide before reaching the c-point at t2 
which of these disjuncts to pursue. But her decision might wait as 
late as t2. Either way, this shows that any partial plan has the 
same structure as a PTD intention. 
 
4.3 The only notable difference is that in the case of the partiality 
	of implementation, the PTD sub-plan is subsumed under a larger 
and longer plan, which need not be disjunctive. In this scenario, 
the PTD sub-plan about what to do at t2 is subsumed under the 
plan to φ at t3. As a result, the effects of the choice among the 
disjuncts is not expected to amplify downstream, but rather to be 
“reabsorbed” soon, since it is a matter of local implementation of 
one’s continuous advance toward the future φ-ing. 
 
4.4 The disjunctive character of PTD intentions becomes more 
dramatic when the choice is supposed to amplify after the c-point. 
But this amplification is not a necessary feature of PTD 
intentions. Likewise, in many cases of partiality, the costs of 
keeping open the mutually incompatible disjunctive sub-plans 
might be much less severe than in the standard PTD intentions, 
since the sub-plans are ultimately alternative ways of 
implementing the same goal, which is set by the master plan. 
Even so, the differences between paradigmatic cases of partial plans 
and paradigmatic instances of PTD intentions are not due to a 
different underlying structure. Both cases share the basic 
structure of pro-tempore disjunction, even if the structure can 
be differently instantiated depending on the specific forces that 
one’s goals and circumstances exert on both the upstream and 
downstream stages of one’s pursuit. 
 
 
5 Partial Intentions 
 
5.1 Richard Holton (2009, Ch. 2) has recently suggested that a 
distinctive kind of attitude—a partial intention—is required to 
handle scenarios similar to the one discussed here. In Holton’s 
example, I intend to remove a tree brought down by a storm. 
There are several possible ways of achieving this end E: I can 
lever the tree with a crowbar, saw it with a chainsaw, drag it with a 
rope, or call the local tree company to move it. These options are 
eventually incompatible. But I do not yet know which is better. 
For the time being, I want to keep all of them open, which 
might force me to bear the costs of multiple preparatory steps. 
 
This scenario falls between the paradigmatic cases of partial 
plans and those of PTD ones. The options are ways of 
implementing a single master end E (like in a partial plan), but the 
	costs of keeping them open are higher than in simple partiality, 
whence the resemblance with standard PTD intentions. As I have 
argued above, the difference between these two scenarios is a 
matter of degree. Hence, I will consider Holton’s proposal as it 
applies more generally. 
5.2 Partial intentions are intention-like attitudes. As Holton 
(2009, 35) writes: partial intentions “play the same roles in 
curtailing deliberation, resolving indeterminacy, and enabling 
coordination that intentions play: you fix on a small number of 
plans from the many that occurred to you and that you might 
have pursued, and as a result of this you can coordinate around 
your other plans [. . . ] and with other people.” What is distinctive 
is that partial intentions, unlike all-out ones, are not subjected to 
the pressure for strong consistency. An all-out intention is 
supposed to be consistent both with the agent’s beliefs and her 
other intentions. But a partial intention is only subjected to a 
weaker requirement: If one partially intends to φ, one is 
required to have a partial belief that one will succeed in φ-ing (or 
at least one is required not to all-out believe that one will fail at φ-
ing)—see Holton (2009, 41–6). 
 
5.3 In support of his account, Holton often appeals to the parallel 
between partial beliefs and partial intentions. But given the 
controversial nature of partial beliefs and the limitations of 
arguments from analogy, I will set these considerations aside. 
 
Additional support comes from an argument by elimination. 
Holton claims that all-out intentions with complex contents 
cannot account for these scenarios. First, we can’t appeal to all-
out conditional intentions since no specific conditions are 
attached to alternative options. Second, all-out disjunctive 
intentions lack appropriate explanatory force. It is only when 
the all-out disjunctive intention is broken down into its 
components (the alleged partial intentions) that the agent’s 
specific actions can be explained. As Holton (2009, 38) writes: “It 
is my partial intention to get the tree company to move the tree 
that causes me to phone them; if we are limited just to all-out 
disjunctive intentions, we can give no explanation of this.” 
5.4 I agree with Holton that explanatory force is crucial. The 
issue arises even when the incompatible options are not 
	subsumed under a single end E. For a standard PTD intention, 
Holton’s concern is that an action such as my making flight 
reservations to Austria could be explained by the partial 
intention to go to Austria, but not by the all-out PTD intention to 
go either to Austria or to Italy. 
5.5 To see where the problem might lie, consider the 
explanatory force of a categorical all-out intention. Imagine that 
I categorically intend to get the tree company to move the tree. It 
is uncontroversial that, if I am rational, this intention might 
explain my phoning the tree company now. This is so when the 
categorical intention is non-deviantly combined with my current 
belief B that (1) phoning the company now is a necessary 
means to get the company to move the tree, and that (2) I have 
now the ability and opportunity to phone the company. 
 
Consider now a partial intention to get the company to move the 
tree. This intention, when non-deviantly combined with the 
belief B, appears as apt as the categorical intention at explaining 
my phoning now. Its partiality makes no difference to its 
explanatory power with respect to my phoning. The partiality 
rather affects which belief is rationally justified on account of 
my intention: I am not justified to all-out believe that I will get 
the company to move the tree, since I might end up handling 
the tree in another manner. But, Holton would claim, I am 
justified in holding the partial belief that the company is going to 
move the tree. So far, so good. 
5.6 Consider now the PTD intention to either call the tree 
company or saw the tree. Does this intention lack explanatory 
power? If I phone the company, this action can be explained by 
combining the PTD intention with the same belief B that I now 
have the ability and opportunity to take the necessary means. 
The disjunctive and pro-tempore character of the intention does 
not seem to make any difference to its explanatory force. Given 
the instrumental fit between phoning the company and getting it 
to move the tree, it seems that the PTD intention together with B 
can explain one’s action in the same way in which a categorical 
intention (either all-out or partial) does.7 
5.7 Even so, one might suggest on Holton’s behalf that in a PTD 
plan the explanation often goes through an intermediate step: in 
	order to implement the plan, the agent might first focus on one 
of the disjuncts and only then considers what she is to do to make 
the disjunct advance. For instance, I might be moved to phone the 
company not directly by the PTD intention but by my focusing 
on the sub-plan of getting the company to come. It is only 
because I am now thinking about getting the company to come 
that the belief B together with the intention explains my action of 
phoning the company. Or so one might argue. 
 
If this is the correct explanation, one might then ask what 
kind of attitude as a rational subject I have toward the disjunct 
that is at the focus of my attention. It seems that I cannot say 
that I all-out intend to get the company since this intention would 
not meet the demand of global consistency. Holton’s suggestion 
would come to the rescue: what I have is just a partial intention, 
which is not under the pressure of global consistency. 
 
5.8 This is a radical solution. It asks us to acknowledge a novel 
kind of attitude. Before going this route, however, we must make 
sure that we cannot accomplish something comparable by relying 
on familiar all-out intentions, albeit ones with a complex content. 
If I have to explain why I am phoning the company, it seems 
that I can appeal to my intention to get the company as one of 
the alternative options that I am still pursuing right now. This is 
the option on which I am focusing my attention right now without 
having thereby acquired a novel kind of attitude. I have a standard 
all-out intention with a content that is qualified as one of the open 
sub-plans of a larger project. 
 
This is a very familiar kind of sub-plan, one in which we often 
engage when implementing a PTD plan. But this sub-plan does 
not commit me to believing that I will succeed in it, since I 
appreciate how the continuous pursuit of the sub-plan 
ultimately depends on the fate of the other options. 
 
The content of my present all-out intention directed at 
getting the company has a complex structure. But this 
complexity just reflects the contribution of this sub-plan to the 
PTD intention. I intend all-out to get the company as the 
alternative on which I am presently focusing among the various 
eventually co-impossible options (which I am still trying to keep 
all open for the time being) to remove the tree. This a perfectly 
	fine content for an all-out intention. One that we are very 
familiar with even if not necessarily one that we would usually 
express in this form. 
5.9 Hence, it is no objection to my analysis in terms of a 
complex content of an all-out intention (rather than of simple 
content of a partial intention) that the intentions toward a sub-
plan of a PTD plan are often expressed categorically. How much 
complexity one is going to express is ultimately a matter of the 
pragmatics of communication. If all that I am trying to 
communicate to you is how my phoning makes any 
instrumental sense, it might be sufficient to say: “I intend to get 
the tree company.” But if you are the one who is supposed to 
provide me with the saw that I need for the alternative sub-plan, I 
will be more inclined to spell out the complexity of my plan. I 
want to avoid any troubling misunderstanding, including your 
giving the saw to someone else. So I might say to you something 
like: “I am phoning the tree company because I want to keep 
open the option of their coming to get the tree but I have not yet 
made up my mind about which is the best way to remove the 
tree. . . so please still lend me the saw.” 
5.10 I have two additional serious reservations about Holton’s 
proposal. First, there should be a methodological presumption 
against the proliferation of novel kinds of attitudes, especially 
on the face of the availability of alternative accounts in terms of 
complex contents. If my previous considerations are correct, 
there is no reason to favor introducing a distinctive kind of 
attitude—a partial one—directed at an unqualified content rather 
than sticking with standard, all-out, attitudes directed at a 
complex content. 
5.11 Second, turning Holton’s objection on its head, I want to 
argue that partial intentions are explanatorily weak. Although a 
partial intention might explain some of the steps of 
implementation, it cannot explain how these steps figure into any 
larger plan and how this might affect their nature and timing. 
Phoning the tree company might be explained by the partial 
intention to get the company, but the fact that I am phoning 
now rather than later, say, might have to do with how this action 
fits with my other concurrent sub-plans. As far as getting the 
company to come, I might have called at a different time. But I 
	have to call now given that at the other times I will be busy 
preparing for the alternative options I am still keeping alive. 
The partial intention cannot explain the timing of my call, since 
these other sub-plans do not figure into the content of the 
partial intention. 
 
True, the partiality of the intention hints at the existence of 
other eventually incompatible sub-plans. But it does so only in 
a generic form that does not help explain the specific unfolding 
of the agent’s conduct in response to the actual character of these 
sub-plans. Likewise, a partial intention offers no explanation of 
why one might find advisable to give up that sub-plan in favor of 
another one. A partial intention, at most, warrants only a partial 
belief in its future success but it is silent on what might stand in 
the way of its being carried out, that is, it is silent on the 
specific character of the alternative sub-plans. Finally, a partial 
intention is not under any rational pressure to handle the 
competing sub-plans. Hence, except for those times when the 
agent does not face any immediate interference from the sub-plans, 
a psychology that operates through partial intentions rather than 
all-out intentions is in danger of being ineffective. 
5.12 The partiality only shows in the irrationality of an all-out 
expectation about future success but it does not affect the 
rationality of the agent’s conduct in the pursuit of the partially 
intended goal. This deprives the partial attitude of its 
explanatory force. If the psychological work were really done 
by the partial attitude, we should expect the rational agent to be 
oblivious to the existence of the competing projects while 
carrying out any specific partially intended goal. But this is 
exactly what we do not expect of such an agent. The only way to 
give a full explanation is to revert to an all-out intention directed 
at a complex disjunctive content. It is only at that level that the 
pressure for global practical consistency is exerted, a pressure 
that plays an indispensable role in any perspicuous 
psychological explanation of the agent’s conduct. 
5.13 To sum up, I see no benefits in preferring an account in terms 
of a partial attitude toward a simple content, rather than an all-out 
attitude toward a complex content. The resources to explain the 
conduct of the rational agent are to be found in the complexity 
of the content. Much work still needs to be done to spell out the 
	implications of the complex contents of intentions both for 
practical rationality and for psychological explanation. But I have 
not yet found compelling reasons to despair that this job can be 
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1		For my view on conditional intentions see Ferrero (2009) and Ferrero (2015). See also 
Yaffe (2004), Klass (2009), and Ludwig (2015).	
2	For a discussion of intentions and underdetermination, see Ferrero (2010), Bratman 
(2012), and Ferrero (2014).	
																																									 																																							 																																							 																																							 																							
3	Normally, in undertaking co-impossible projects in the pro-tempore mode, an agent 
expects that if she is unable to determine which is better by the c-point, she will be 
indifferent between them at that point. When that happens, she can resolve the 
indifference by relying on any of the mechanisms that operate for standard disjunctive 
intentions of indifference. In some special cases, the agent might qualify her PTD 
intention by specifying what she would do at the c-point if she has not been able to 
determine which disjunct is best by then. For instance, she might even intend to pursue 
neither at that point.	
4	For further discussion of agglomerativity see Bratman (2008) and Yaffe (2009).	
5	For a discussion of how conditional intentions become moot, see Ferrero (2009, 705–
7) and Ludwig (2015).	
6	For a discussion of the transformation of a conditional intention into what I call a 
“circumstantially unconditional” one, see Ferrero (2009, 710).	
7	If the intention is disjunctive because of my indifference between getting the company to 
move the tree and sawing the tree myself, phoning might not be necessary to the 
intention’s success. It is only when it is no longer possible for me to saw the tree that 
phoning the company becomes necessary for the success of the disjunctive intention. 
However, this does not entail that one is unable to explain the taking of nonnecessary 
means to the success of a disjunctive intention. One could explain this in the same way 
as one explains the taking of non-necessary means for either categorical all-out 
intentions or for partial intentions. Whatever additional elements, if any, might be 
required to complete the explanation for these intentions, these elements appear to be 
available for disjunctive intentions as well, both all-out and PTD ones. In any event, unlike 
the case of indifference, if I have a PTD intention, phoning the company might be a 
necessary means to the success of this intention even if sawing the tree myself is still an 
available option. For phoning is a necessary means to getting the company to move the 
tree, which is something that I am presently committed to, given that I am committed to 
keeping both options open for the time being.	
8	An earlier (and much longer) version of this paper was presented at talks at USC, 
Queens University at Kingston, and the University of Toronto. Thanks to the 
audiences, and especially to Philip Clark, David Hunter, Rahul Kumar, Lewis Powell, 
Sergio Tenenbaum, Gary Watson, George Wilson, and Gideon Yaffe. Thanks for 
stimulating conversations to Ray Buchanan and Luis Cheng-Guajardo. Thanks to 
Roman Altshuler and Michael Sigrist for their comments and editorial work. A special 
thank you to Gideon Yaffe who first prompted me to think about disjunctive intentions.	
